ZERO COCA: Two sides of the same coin
By Alfonso M. Dorado E.
Elizabeth Santalla V.
BOLIVIA
Paradoxically in Bolivia, where consumption of the cocaine is one of the lowest in the world in comparison to the "industrilized" countries, one of the most radical antidrug policies is practiced, in particular against the cultivation of coca.
Coca is a millennial and sacred plant for the original indigenous population, which serves now as a basic precursor of cocaine. In fact, Art 1 of the Law Nº 1008 of Coca and Controlled Substances Regimen (Ley N°1008), makes the following definition: “The coca, whose scientific name corresponds to the gender erithroxilum, constitutes a natural product of the tropical areas of La Paz and Cochabamba. It is presented in a wild state or in agricultural cultivations whose antiquity goes back to the Bolivian before Columbus histor.”
International Conferences, different states and international organizations have recognized to be losing the “war against drugs”, in spite of the fact that in Bolivia, for instance, the year 2000 became a historical year in the successful and almost complete eradication of the cultivation of the plant of coca, which is considered to be illegal according to Law Nº 1008, Articles 8 - 14.
The government and Bolivia’s population in general have begun to feel the effects of the abrupt escape of more than 500 millions of dollars from the financial system, which mostly used to came from the trafficking in narcotics and money laundering. According to Lasera (1996), such a situation has contributed to the increase of very serious social conflicts in less than eight months. In fact, one of those derived in the promulgation of a State of Siege in which civilians were even murdered, and general human rights daily violated, getting undressed the other faces of the coin… corruption, the lack of social governmental policies and the structural poverty of a country that is currently restricted from one of its financing sources … the coca and the traffic of drugs. (Laserna, 1996).
If in itself the globalization and its model have generated uncertainty toward the future, in Bolivia these uncertainties are now more evident and the questions about the degree of consistency in the antidrug policies, influenced by the North American administration, are also made more evident.
Leaf of Coca, the Sacred and Millennial Leaf.
It has been recognized by the legal framework of Bolivian antidrug policies, Law Nº 1008, that the leaf of Coca is inherently bound to cultural practices of the indigenous population of the Andean area of South America, such as medical purposes, even since the Incario Imperium.
Historically, due to its feautures, the leaf of Coca was and is used to combat the hunger and to achieve the consumer's bigger resistance, by means of its chewed, traditionally called akulliku. In fact, Spanish conquerors took quite advantage from those virtues when exploiting the South American natives work in the mines by means of the famous mitas or obrajes, where extremely long working hours were imposed, amounting to eighteen hours a day. (Ambos, 1998).
The archives of the Bolivian Parliament demonstrate how important the cultivation of the leaf of coca has been to Bolivia’s economy since its foundation as a new South American republic.
Gradually, during the XX Century, the coca began to be the subject matter of a series of regulations that ended up in the typification of a crime, after the Vienna Convention of 1988 that categorizes the leaf of coca as an illicit precursor for the elaboration of cocaine.
The Leaf of Coca and the Cocaine
According to Laserna (1996), the beginning of the use of the leaf of coca for the elaboration of cocaine has as historical references the different dictatorial governments from the decade of the years '60, culminating in the shameless concealment to the traffic of drugs by the Government of García Mesa 1980, whose Minister of Internal Affairs, Arce Gómez, was even denominated by the american tv program “60 Minutes” as “Minister of the Cocaine.”
Nowdays the former-dictator García Mesa, the former-dictator's and recently former constitutional President from Bolivia old friend, Gral. Hugo Banzer, is in the prison of maximum security of La Paz, Chonchocoro, serving a sentence of 30 years of imprisonment without right to judicial pardon for the murders and acts of corruption that took place during his facto regimen. As well, his former minister of Internal Affairs, Arce Gómez is in a prison of Florida, US, after an illegal order of expulsion granted by the former president of Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora.
After the ratification of the Vienna Convention of 1988 and the consequent promulgation of Law Nº1008 the same year, for the first time in Bolivia´s history, the cultivation of the leaf of Coca is considered illegal in a large part of the territory, with the exception of the so called traditional areas in Yungas.
The legitimacy of Law Nº 1008 has been from the very beginning exposed to criticism for its constitutional underpinnings, specially by its application of the "presumption of culpability", besides its serious deficiencies that have derived in the systematic violation of the due process in many criminal cases related to the traffic of drugs. (Laserna, 1996).
Because of the influence exercised by the US to maintain a hard legislation in relation to the traffic of drugs, few have been the top Bolivian officials that have dared to carry out substantial modifications.
During the previous administration of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997), the then Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Dr. René Blatmann, was the promoter of several legal modifications, among those the derogation of some anti-constitutional articles of Law Nº 1008. The same administration, it is said that in return, approved a new Treaty of Extradition with the United States by which the traffic of drugs and related crimes are subject to extradition.
The Effects of the Stabilization Plan and its Structural Adjustments: Plantations of Coca and Migratory Flows
In 1985, the implementation of drastic policies of monetary stabilization and structural adjustment “proposed” by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB (World Bank), caused the massive discharge of thousands of miners and workers of different factories of the country.
The social and economic crisis generated big migratory flows toward areas where lucrative activities were developed. The most attractive was in fact the cultivation of coca whose demand increased as well as its high price in the market.
Consequentely, the former-miners and former-workers became farmers of the leaf of coca, having this lucrative activity as their almost unique source of subsistence. As such, they achieved, for the first time, more fairness in the exchange terms of products for their sector, which is a result of the system of the offert and demand.
The area chosen by migrants for its tropical climate and fertile earth for the cultivation of the leaf of Coca, that requires of certain particularities for its growth and crop, was the Chapare region in Cochabamba. Chapare, as other isolated regions in the country, has lacked of institutional presence of the State. At present, the said area is considered, according to Law 1008, as an excedentary area of the cultivation of coca and therefore illegal.
Paz Zamora´s Policy: “Coca is Not Cocaine”
In light of the social cost that the imposition of orthodox monetary policies had represented, and recognizing the social facet that the problem of the farmers of coca embraced in Chapare, Jaime Paz Zamora’s administration (1989 -1993) began an international campaign that was summarized as: “COCA IS NOT COCAINE”.
However, this motto did not seem to please the government of the United States, even more when Paz Zamora designated as Major of the FELCN the former-Cnl. Rico Toro, a former-militar of the dictatorial regimen, pointed out by the DEA as being indirectly involved in the traffic of drugs. After such an appointment, Paz Zamora´s administration was subjected to strong pressures that were aimed at obtaining the abrupt resignation of his former Minister of Internal Affairs, Guillermo Capobianco, that was followed by the resignation of the National Commandant of the Police.
The MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the former President Paz Zamora’s political party, has denounced the existence of a supposed “OPERATION WITHOUT END” that would be directed from the Embassy of the United States and whose purpose would be to destroy this political party by systematic and permanent persecution to its leaders. In fact, the second man of trust and influence of MIR, Oscar Eid Franco, was prosecuted and sentenced to prison because of his apparently connection with the drug dealer, who already passed by, “Oso” Chavarría who may also have financed the electoral campaign of Paz Zamora. It should be pointed out that it is quite unusual for Bolivia, to see a person of influence and politial power be prosecuted and convicted for common crimes.
On the other hand, as indicated by Wola (1993), Paz Zamora as well as the former President of Perú, Alberto Fujimori, was contrary to the military element in the Andean Strategy, demanding instead a serious economic approach to the problem. The US government, after the Cartagena Declaration, recognized that a central objective of the economic assistance was to have the military forces of the Andean countries engaged in the "war against drugs".
As an example of the said military strategy, the DEA´s "Snowcap Operation" from March 1987 is worth mentioning. It introduced agents in Bolivia, Perú and Equator for a period of 90 days, in order to help to plan and coordinate actions against the laboratories and the different production and distribution steps of cocain. In general, in Bolivia, the plan is designed to allow small specialist american groups to choose the targets, plan the attacks and coordinate the operations carried on by the local military forces and the DEA. (Wola, 1993).
In fact, when the US South Command in 1990 realeased a proposal -that did not have the Pentagon authorization- aimed at having the US to plan and coordinate attacks by air and earth of the army forces of the Andean countries against the most important drugs centers, the government of Paz Zamora strongly criticized it. As a result, the plan was left out without effect. (Wola, 1993).
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1991, for instance, the US temporarily stopped the economic help to Bolivia, due to its lack of cooperation in the untidrugs activities. Although the help was reestablished, the Bolivian government has continued to be under the American pressure since the American Congress links the untidrugs cooperation to the US help to achieve the international financing institutional loans.
The Policy of Fighting the Cultivation of Coca, the Traffic of Drugs and Alternative Development
Sanchez de Lozada’s previous administration (1993-1997), conducted the fight against the traffic of drugs, mainly by means of voluntary eradication of the leaf of coca and by means of economic compensations to its producers (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000). Such a strategy had a moderate but not enough success (Leida and Oomen, 1994; CEDOIN, 1994; USAID, 1990).
Parallelly, studies of plans of alternative development continued with more intensity to be developed, although so far have not given any effective answer to the social problem due to the enormous breach between the income generated by the export of traditional products and the production of the leaf of coca (Leida and Oomen, 1994; CEDOIN, 1994; USAID, 1990).
Year 2000: ZERO COCA: A "Dry Law" to the Bolivian manner? - Consequences at Financial, Political, and Social Level
The initiation and return to the power in 1997 of the former dictator, Gral. Hugo Banzer Suárez (1997-2001), is characterized by the firm political will of eradicating, by any means, all the cultivations of illegal coca, according to Law 1008.
While the UNDCP (United Nations Drugs Control Program) and the DEA developed the fungus FUSARIUM OXYSPORUM, as a means to eradicate the plant of coca, the Bolivian government opted out for the mandatory eradication of plant by plant in charge of troops of military and policemen.
The end of the year 2000 was marked by the successful achievement of the said governmental goal, since the cultivations of the leaf of coca were almost entirely eradicated in Chapare. Although according to a recent report of the Embassy of the United States in La Paz, there would be still about 6000 hectares in Chapare and about 2600 in the rest of Bolivia, as indicated by their satellites (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
However, the governmental success in the eradication of the leaf of coca was not accompanied by serious alternative development policies. Nor were foreseen with wide vision the serious social, economic-financial and political consequences of those measures.
The 500 millions of dollars that ran away from the Bolivian financial system, were deemed to have been generated by the traffic of drugs. As a result, the country has been exposed to a serious recession and strong contraction of its comparative advantage, which led to two serious social convulsions in the months of April and September. The first one derived in the promulgation of a State of Siege, as well as in the death of almost thirty persons and in a hundred of wounded people, besides the systematic violations to human rights.
While in the last four years the leaf of Coca was being eradicated in Bolivia, more than 222% of cultivations of Coca in Colombia were grown, reaching to more than 100.000 hectares (Nolasco Presiga, 2000), phenomenon known as the "balloon effect" (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
Although a flow of capitals is noticed as well as a transfer of cultivations of coca toward Colombia, Bolivia is not free from the threat of an eventual “colombianization”, even more after the last social convulsions lived in the country whose main protagonists were not only the producers of the leaf of coca, but also peasants of the whole country and some urban sectors of middle class. This leaves some uncertainty on the immediate future that is also infested by the widespread corruption, inserted in the main institutions of the State (police, parliament, judiciary.. etc.,) (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
As a result of the apparent success in the eradication of coca plantations, according to La Razón (2001), Bolivia has become rather than a main producer country a country of transit for the traffic of drugs and with serious difficulties in the social and economic spheres.
The so Called "Dignity Plan"
During the Banzer administration the so called "Dignity Plan" was implemented. It basically meant achieveng "zero coca" or full eradication of coca leafs in return of economic cooperation from the US. In fact, in his Presidency, during 1997 and 2000, 40,000 hectares (forty thousand) of coca plantations were eradicated. (La Razón, 2001). According to the government, since February 2001 until September 2001, 6,000 hectares (six thousand) of what is considered to be "illegal coca" under Law 1008, have been eradicated. (La Razón, September 2001).
Another important sample of Banzer´s commitment with the "Dignity Plan", has been his support and endorsement of the "Carabobo Declaration", signed by the Presidents of the CAN in its XIII Summit held in Venezuela last June 2001, which contains some articles that establish a common anti drugs strategy. (La Razón, June 2001).
Under Quiroga’s administration (2001-2002), the plan has said to be continued. In fact, after the recent trip undertook by the government with the American Embassy to Chapare to verify the reemergence of coca, President Quiroga affirmed that such illegal coca will be completely eradicated under the "Dignity Plan". (La Razón, September, 2001).
In fact, the "Dignity Plan" has been recentely offitially described as: "dignity means to have a Bolivia free from trafficking in narcotics, not exposed to external impositions, free from drugs estigma, poverty and corruption. Dignity implies to build a democratic culture, based on the full participation of its inhabitants, in the exercise of their rights and the capacity to improve with creativity and work, in order to globally compete in the new millenium." (www.antidroga.gov.bo).
Alternative Development, Eradication, and Interdiction are the basic lines of action of the "Dignity Plan", which are essential to attack the offer of drugs. Those actions are primarily conducted in the coca producing regions and in those potential areas of illegal plantation, such as national parks. A basic strategy is to involve the "cocaleros" in the process of eradication and alternative development, conscious and wilfully. (politica anti-droga).
Therefore, the actual strategy of antidrugs policy in Bolivia, is aimed at reaffirming the national dignity, reinforce the national decision capacity, eliminate the economic dependence of some peasant groups on the coca production and protect the society from the potential harm of trafficking in narcotics. (www.antidroga.gov.bo).
Nevertheless, it may be questioned if the national dignity is really at stake, when Bolivia is not an important consuming country. As well, if there is a serious national decision capacity in the toppic, when public legitimacy seems to be lacking. And finally, if the economic dependence of some peasant sectors on the coca production can be drastically stopped without interfering in culture relativism.
However, some elements of the American influence in the "war against drugs" can be characterized as common feautures of the different Bolivian administrations, described before. These are: the training of army forces, the suppliance of equipment and advise "to capture" the important drugdealers, the coordination of intelligence activities, and the military integration in the application of untidrugs policies.
The Social and Human Rights Site
Eventhough the American "narco guerrilla" theory was not directly applied to the Bolivian case, an increasing link between antidrug policies and internal conflicts has emerged, consequently questioning the final outcome achieved by the American military strategy. (Wola, 1993).
Taking into account that, as indicated by Wola (1993), approximately, 75,000 families are involved in the industry generated by coca and that thousands of persons benefit from employment undirectly derived from it, a social conflict is created when drastic eradication policies are tried to be enforced by the use of force (military, police), which is in fact, well known for its corruption.
Therefore, as a consequence of the "coca zero" strategy, numerous violent confrontations have taken place between the antidrug forces and the civil local population. In fact, some "cocaleros" groups have stimulated the constitution of selfdefense groups to confront the Bolivian military operatives. This situation, linked to the violation of human rights, has given place to think about the possibility of undermining the civil institutions by having an active and central participation of the corrupted military in the "war against drugs".
In fact, last year "cocaleros" organized several national strikes, basically complaining that the government did not comply with the compromises that it assumed. Among them, the set up of proper alternatives to compensate the loss of income derived from the production and commercialization of coca, the offer to give $930 (nine hundred thirty dollars) per year to those who seed anything but coca in the Chapare region, and recently, to "buy" cocaleros the earth. This last proposal has particularly touched the cocaleros sensibilities, who have firmly expressed that coca, in its natural stage, is not cocaine, and that therefore their land and culture should be respected. (La Razón, October, 2001).
"Cocaleros" are mainly demanding that each of the 35.000 families that live in Chapare, could be allowed to cultivate a "cato" of coca, since the guvernmental plan of product substitution has failed for its lack of market competition. As this proposal was rejected by the government, the "cocaleros" declared to be ready to confront the military and police forces (4.000 soldiers) that are located in the area (La Razón, October, 2001).
Before such a reaction, the former President, Jorge Quiroga, stated not to be concerned about the "political bill" and that they will not rest until there is not illegal coca any more. And, that as part of the "Dignity Plan" at least 10.000 families that live in Chapare, shoul accept to be resettled to La Paz, Beni or Santa Cruz. (La Razón, November, 2001).
Consequentely, Amnisty International, in a press release (October, 2001), has denounced that human rights can not be eradicated along the plant of coca. As well, it has asserted that is already time to break the pattern of violations of human rights that has characterized the application of the agreements concluded with the United States for the eradication of cultivations of the plant of coca. Also, it underlined that when assuring the execution of this agreements, the Bolivian authorities cannot ignore the dispositions of their own Constitution and of the international agreements, to which Bolivia is a State Party, that consecrate the fundamental human rights.
As well, as stated by Wola (1993), the human rights concern has not been an important element in any agreement concluded by the US and Bolivia. What is more, by reinforcing the institutions of security in countries such as Bolivia, where they usually act beyond the law, human rights and civil liberties are certainly in danger.
On the other hand, the threatens of the Embassador of the US in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, to suspend the cooperation of his country if the eradication is stopped, have been strongly criticized. (La Razón, November, 2001).
As a result of the repression strategy, the "balloon effect" generated has had important consequences, not only in the production of cocaine issues but also in the levels of violence, producing the phenomenon of internally displaced people. (La Razón, October, 2001).
The Double Standards in the Antidrugs Policy
What strikes the attention in the fight against the trafficking in drugs is the double standards applied by some states and governments, in particular of the United States of America.
To exemplify, the HUANCHACA case can be remembered, which occured at the end of the '80s, when the well known Bolivian scientific, Noël Kempf Mercado, was murdered by drug dealers. However, after that murder it is questionable that the laboratories of cocaine, found in the place of the incident, belonged to the CIA. Such a fact was being investigated at the time by senator Salazar, who was also murdered.
It should be remembered that coincidentally, at that time, the CIA was involved in the case ”IRAN / CONTRAS” (better known as “IRANGATE”), where the trade of drugs and weapons by means of a circuit between Iran and the paramilitary “Contras” of Nicaragua, allowing to this intelligence organism the generation of illegal sources of financing for the realization of different operations was denounced. In all of this trouble, the DEA played an important role disclosing information concerning the Huanchaca case. Evidentely, this was part of the struggle for a bigger federal budget that arose at that time between the DEA and the CIA.
As well, the well known incitement to the consumption of drugs by the government of the US to its own soldiers in Vietnam, is worth to be recalled while talking about the double standards applied by the US in the “war against drugs”. It makes also difficult to find a legitimate authority to fight the drugs abroad in a state that lacks of serious domestic policies to face its own social dilema given by the great demand of drugs that it has (Wola, 1993).
In fact, as aserted by Peter Reuter in Wola (1993), it has been seen along the years that the eradication programs, the sustitution or the destruction of laboratories, do not represent an effective tool to achieve the consuming reduction in the US.
It is also questionable why the US and Europe do not adopt sanctions against the big transnational and corporations that produce the essential precursors (sulfuric acid, thiner, etc.,) for the production of cocaine and other drugs that move more than 500.000 millions of dollars each year (Nolasco Presiga, 2000).
Nevertheless, it has been a primary objective for the american government to dismantle the drug dealers organizations in the Andean region, as has happened in the Bolivian case. In fact, the CIA and DEA have invested millions of dollars in inteligence operations to closely follow and control probable drug dealers. As an example of that, the controversial operation that took place in Santa Ana, Bolivia, in June 1991, can be mentioned. (Wola, 1993).
Neither the government of the US nor the one of Bolivia have worried as much in other type of drugs, such as the alcohol, that has become a serious issue of public health and represents one of the main causes of death in Bolivia. (La Razón, 2001). What kind of social and sustained policies do these governments assume toward their youth to avoid the consumption of drugs? What kind of society and future offer them? These are some of the questions that people wonder at present in Bolivia.
In light of such a paradox, it can be asserted that the anti drug policy of the United States and its firm will to maintain the traffic of drugs as an illegal activity responds rather to economic reasons and of survival of its own federal agencies, but also to geo-strategic dominance plans (Ambos, 1998).
In fact, as stated by Wola (1993), the american military forces try to justify its budgets and technologies with the "war against drugs". The training given to the Bolivian "antidrug forces" is similar to the one given to the infantry. Nevertheless, most of top officials still believe that enforcing untidrug policies is not an appropriate task for the military.
After September the 11th, the US redesigned a foreign diplomatic agenda. As a result, for Latin American countries in particular, the condition to render financial assistance has become narrowly linked to the war against "narcoterrorism". In that regard, the former American Ambassador in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, publicly expressed the parallel drawn by American authorities between narcotics and terrorism (Debate - La Epoca, August 25, 2002). What is more, the same former Bolivia's President, Jorge Quiroga, following that trend publicly identified the trafficking in narcotics and terrorism as "twins", giving place to think on a broader and probably indiscriminate war against drugs (Mirtenbaum, 2002).
As a consequence, it can be asserted that at present, the support for market reforms and democracy building process, priorities that embraced the former American agendas, have become subordinated to the war against drugs (Gamarra, 2002).
That shift of interest has been certainly reflected by the performance of the former American Ambassador in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha. He played an important role in the "opposition" directed to Evo Morales, the coca producers’ leader, member of Congress and former candidate to the presidency who achieved the second position in the last presidential election (July, 2002). In fact, four days before the presidential elections, on June 26, 2002, Rocha, while giving a speech in front of the former President Quiroga, said that "Bolivians should take into account the consequences derived from electing leaders somehow connected to narcotics and terrorism" (Gomez, July 21, 2002).
As well, Manfred Reyes Villa, presidential candidate who obtained the third place, publicly admitted that he had been "advised" by Manuel Rocha not to form any political alliance with the Movement toward Socialism, Morales' political party (Chávez, July, 2002).
In spite of the strong criticism that the position undertaken by the former American Ambassador in Bolivia generated among civil society and in the same Presidential candidates, the government awarded Manuel Rocha the annual prize conferred to "distinguished personalities", before he left office (August, 2002).
As it can be noticed, Sanchez de Lozada's current administration is between two dangerous scenarios: carry on with the eradication strategy and assume the social cost that it embraces, or not assume it but instead face the consequences derived to Bolivia from its relationship with the US.
In a global economy of free market where the logic of th offer and demand is the governing law, maintaining the illicit character for certain drugs seems to be incoherent, just as has been asserted by the American nobel prize of economy, Milton Friedman, and after the well known unsuccessful experience of the “Dry Law” at the beginning of last century.
Since 1997 to present, 44.515 hectares of coca were destroyed. In 1997, 3717 hectares were eradicated. In 1998, 11.621; in 1999, 16.999; in 2000, 7953, and during 2001 -until October- 4212. According to this data, the government affirmes that at present, the production of cocaine is less than a half of what was produced in 1997. (La Razón, November, 2001). Nevertheless, according to the Latinamerican Research Center, along these last four years, the amount of people who consume drugs has increased, in particular in relation to marihuana.
Therefore, it is questionable if such a repressive policy against the leaf of coca is justified, when despite the will of a developing country such as Bolivia, it is clear that the trafficking in narcotics will continue to exist, and even more when the respect of human rights and social welfare are at stage.
(*) Lawyers, LL.M International Law
(**)Paper for Idaho University (USA) and Max Planck Institute for International Criminal Law (Germany)
Elizabeth Santalla V.
BOLIVIA
Paradoxically in Bolivia, where consumption of the cocaine is one of the lowest in the world in comparison to the "industrilized" countries, one of the most radical antidrug policies is practiced, in particular against the cultivation of coca.
Coca is a millennial and sacred plant for the original indigenous population, which serves now as a basic precursor of cocaine. In fact, Art 1 of the Law Nº 1008 of Coca and Controlled Substances Regimen (Ley N°1008), makes the following definition: “The coca, whose scientific name corresponds to the gender erithroxilum, constitutes a natural product of the tropical areas of La Paz and Cochabamba. It is presented in a wild state or in agricultural cultivations whose antiquity goes back to the Bolivian before Columbus histor.”
International Conferences, different states and international organizations have recognized to be losing the “war against drugs”, in spite of the fact that in Bolivia, for instance, the year 2000 became a historical year in the successful and almost complete eradication of the cultivation of the plant of coca, which is considered to be illegal according to Law Nº 1008, Articles 8 - 14.
The government and Bolivia’s population in general have begun to feel the effects of the abrupt escape of more than 500 millions of dollars from the financial system, which mostly used to came from the trafficking in narcotics and money laundering. According to Lasera (1996), such a situation has contributed to the increase of very serious social conflicts in less than eight months. In fact, one of those derived in the promulgation of a State of Siege in which civilians were even murdered, and general human rights daily violated, getting undressed the other faces of the coin… corruption, the lack of social governmental policies and the structural poverty of a country that is currently restricted from one of its financing sources … the coca and the traffic of drugs. (Laserna, 1996).
If in itself the globalization and its model have generated uncertainty toward the future, in Bolivia these uncertainties are now more evident and the questions about the degree of consistency in the antidrug policies, influenced by the North American administration, are also made more evident.
Leaf of Coca, the Sacred and Millennial Leaf.
It has been recognized by the legal framework of Bolivian antidrug policies, Law Nº 1008, that the leaf of Coca is inherently bound to cultural practices of the indigenous population of the Andean area of South America, such as medical purposes, even since the Incario Imperium.
Historically, due to its feautures, the leaf of Coca was and is used to combat the hunger and to achieve the consumer's bigger resistance, by means of its chewed, traditionally called akulliku. In fact, Spanish conquerors took quite advantage from those virtues when exploiting the South American natives work in the mines by means of the famous mitas or obrajes, where extremely long working hours were imposed, amounting to eighteen hours a day. (Ambos, 1998).
The archives of the Bolivian Parliament demonstrate how important the cultivation of the leaf of coca has been to Bolivia’s economy since its foundation as a new South American republic.
Gradually, during the XX Century, the coca began to be the subject matter of a series of regulations that ended up in the typification of a crime, after the Vienna Convention of 1988 that categorizes the leaf of coca as an illicit precursor for the elaboration of cocaine.
The Leaf of Coca and the Cocaine
According to Laserna (1996), the beginning of the use of the leaf of coca for the elaboration of cocaine has as historical references the different dictatorial governments from the decade of the years '60, culminating in the shameless concealment to the traffic of drugs by the Government of García Mesa 1980, whose Minister of Internal Affairs, Arce Gómez, was even denominated by the american tv program “60 Minutes” as “Minister of the Cocaine.”
Nowdays the former-dictator García Mesa, the former-dictator's and recently former constitutional President from Bolivia old friend, Gral. Hugo Banzer, is in the prison of maximum security of La Paz, Chonchocoro, serving a sentence of 30 years of imprisonment without right to judicial pardon for the murders and acts of corruption that took place during his facto regimen. As well, his former minister of Internal Affairs, Arce Gómez is in a prison of Florida, US, after an illegal order of expulsion granted by the former president of Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora.
After the ratification of the Vienna Convention of 1988 and the consequent promulgation of Law Nº1008 the same year, for the first time in Bolivia´s history, the cultivation of the leaf of Coca is considered illegal in a large part of the territory, with the exception of the so called traditional areas in Yungas.
The legitimacy of Law Nº 1008 has been from the very beginning exposed to criticism for its constitutional underpinnings, specially by its application of the "presumption of culpability", besides its serious deficiencies that have derived in the systematic violation of the due process in many criminal cases related to the traffic of drugs. (Laserna, 1996).
Because of the influence exercised by the US to maintain a hard legislation in relation to the traffic of drugs, few have been the top Bolivian officials that have dared to carry out substantial modifications.
During the previous administration of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997), the then Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Dr. René Blatmann, was the promoter of several legal modifications, among those the derogation of some anti-constitutional articles of Law Nº 1008. The same administration, it is said that in return, approved a new Treaty of Extradition with the United States by which the traffic of drugs and related crimes are subject to extradition.
The Effects of the Stabilization Plan and its Structural Adjustments: Plantations of Coca and Migratory Flows
In 1985, the implementation of drastic policies of monetary stabilization and structural adjustment “proposed” by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB (World Bank), caused the massive discharge of thousands of miners and workers of different factories of the country.
The social and economic crisis generated big migratory flows toward areas where lucrative activities were developed. The most attractive was in fact the cultivation of coca whose demand increased as well as its high price in the market.
Consequentely, the former-miners and former-workers became farmers of the leaf of coca, having this lucrative activity as their almost unique source of subsistence. As such, they achieved, for the first time, more fairness in the exchange terms of products for their sector, which is a result of the system of the offert and demand.
The area chosen by migrants for its tropical climate and fertile earth for the cultivation of the leaf of Coca, that requires of certain particularities for its growth and crop, was the Chapare region in Cochabamba. Chapare, as other isolated regions in the country, has lacked of institutional presence of the State. At present, the said area is considered, according to Law 1008, as an excedentary area of the cultivation of coca and therefore illegal.
Paz Zamora´s Policy: “Coca is Not Cocaine”
In light of the social cost that the imposition of orthodox monetary policies had represented, and recognizing the social facet that the problem of the farmers of coca embraced in Chapare, Jaime Paz Zamora’s administration (1989 -1993) began an international campaign that was summarized as: “COCA IS NOT COCAINE”.
However, this motto did not seem to please the government of the United States, even more when Paz Zamora designated as Major of the FELCN the former-Cnl. Rico Toro, a former-militar of the dictatorial regimen, pointed out by the DEA as being indirectly involved in the traffic of drugs. After such an appointment, Paz Zamora´s administration was subjected to strong pressures that were aimed at obtaining the abrupt resignation of his former Minister of Internal Affairs, Guillermo Capobianco, that was followed by the resignation of the National Commandant of the Police.
The MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), the former President Paz Zamora’s political party, has denounced the existence of a supposed “OPERATION WITHOUT END” that would be directed from the Embassy of the United States and whose purpose would be to destroy this political party by systematic and permanent persecution to its leaders. In fact, the second man of trust and influence of MIR, Oscar Eid Franco, was prosecuted and sentenced to prison because of his apparently connection with the drug dealer, who already passed by, “Oso” Chavarría who may also have financed the electoral campaign of Paz Zamora. It should be pointed out that it is quite unusual for Bolivia, to see a person of influence and politial power be prosecuted and convicted for common crimes.
On the other hand, as indicated by Wola (1993), Paz Zamora as well as the former President of Perú, Alberto Fujimori, was contrary to the military element in the Andean Strategy, demanding instead a serious economic approach to the problem. The US government, after the Cartagena Declaration, recognized that a central objective of the economic assistance was to have the military forces of the Andean countries engaged in the "war against drugs".
As an example of the said military strategy, the DEA´s "Snowcap Operation" from March 1987 is worth mentioning. It introduced agents in Bolivia, Perú and Equator for a period of 90 days, in order to help to plan and coordinate actions against the laboratories and the different production and distribution steps of cocain. In general, in Bolivia, the plan is designed to allow small specialist american groups to choose the targets, plan the attacks and coordinate the operations carried on by the local military forces and the DEA. (Wola, 1993).
In fact, when the US South Command in 1990 realeased a proposal -that did not have the Pentagon authorization- aimed at having the US to plan and coordinate attacks by air and earth of the army forces of the Andean countries against the most important drugs centers, the government of Paz Zamora strongly criticized it. As a result, the plan was left out without effect. (Wola, 1993).
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1991, for instance, the US temporarily stopped the economic help to Bolivia, due to its lack of cooperation in the untidrugs activities. Although the help was reestablished, the Bolivian government has continued to be under the American pressure since the American Congress links the untidrugs cooperation to the US help to achieve the international financing institutional loans.
The Policy of Fighting the Cultivation of Coca, the Traffic of Drugs and Alternative Development
Sanchez de Lozada’s previous administration (1993-1997), conducted the fight against the traffic of drugs, mainly by means of voluntary eradication of the leaf of coca and by means of economic compensations to its producers (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000). Such a strategy had a moderate but not enough success (Leida and Oomen, 1994; CEDOIN, 1994; USAID, 1990).
Parallelly, studies of plans of alternative development continued with more intensity to be developed, although so far have not given any effective answer to the social problem due to the enormous breach between the income generated by the export of traditional products and the production of the leaf of coca (Leida and Oomen, 1994; CEDOIN, 1994; USAID, 1990).
Year 2000: ZERO COCA: A "Dry Law" to the Bolivian manner? - Consequences at Financial, Political, and Social Level
The initiation and return to the power in 1997 of the former dictator, Gral. Hugo Banzer Suárez (1997-2001), is characterized by the firm political will of eradicating, by any means, all the cultivations of illegal coca, according to Law 1008.
While the UNDCP (United Nations Drugs Control Program) and the DEA developed the fungus FUSARIUM OXYSPORUM, as a means to eradicate the plant of coca, the Bolivian government opted out for the mandatory eradication of plant by plant in charge of troops of military and policemen.
The end of the year 2000 was marked by the successful achievement of the said governmental goal, since the cultivations of the leaf of coca were almost entirely eradicated in Chapare. Although according to a recent report of the Embassy of the United States in La Paz, there would be still about 6000 hectares in Chapare and about 2600 in the rest of Bolivia, as indicated by their satellites (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
However, the governmental success in the eradication of the leaf of coca was not accompanied by serious alternative development policies. Nor were foreseen with wide vision the serious social, economic-financial and political consequences of those measures.
The 500 millions of dollars that ran away from the Bolivian financial system, were deemed to have been generated by the traffic of drugs. As a result, the country has been exposed to a serious recession and strong contraction of its comparative advantage, which led to two serious social convulsions in the months of April and September. The first one derived in the promulgation of a State of Siege, as well as in the death of almost thirty persons and in a hundred of wounded people, besides the systematic violations to human rights.
While in the last four years the leaf of Coca was being eradicated in Bolivia, more than 222% of cultivations of Coca in Colombia were grown, reaching to more than 100.000 hectares (Nolasco Presiga, 2000), phenomenon known as the "balloon effect" (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
Although a flow of capitals is noticed as well as a transfer of cultivations of coca toward Colombia, Bolivia is not free from the threat of an eventual “colombianization”, even more after the last social convulsions lived in the country whose main protagonists were not only the producers of the leaf of coca, but also peasants of the whole country and some urban sectors of middle class. This leaves some uncertainty on the immediate future that is also infested by the widespread corruption, inserted in the main institutions of the State (police, parliament, judiciary.. etc.,) (Medinacelli and Zambrana, 2000).
As a result of the apparent success in the eradication of coca plantations, according to La Razón (2001), Bolivia has become rather than a main producer country a country of transit for the traffic of drugs and with serious difficulties in the social and economic spheres.
The so Called "Dignity Plan"
During the Banzer administration the so called "Dignity Plan" was implemented. It basically meant achieveng "zero coca" or full eradication of coca leafs in return of economic cooperation from the US. In fact, in his Presidency, during 1997 and 2000, 40,000 hectares (forty thousand) of coca plantations were eradicated. (La Razón, 2001). According to the government, since February 2001 until September 2001, 6,000 hectares (six thousand) of what is considered to be "illegal coca" under Law 1008, have been eradicated. (La Razón, September 2001).
Another important sample of Banzer´s commitment with the "Dignity Plan", has been his support and endorsement of the "Carabobo Declaration", signed by the Presidents of the CAN in its XIII Summit held in Venezuela last June 2001, which contains some articles that establish a common anti drugs strategy. (La Razón, June 2001).
Under Quiroga’s administration (2001-2002), the plan has said to be continued. In fact, after the recent trip undertook by the government with the American Embassy to Chapare to verify the reemergence of coca, President Quiroga affirmed that such illegal coca will be completely eradicated under the "Dignity Plan". (La Razón, September, 2001).
In fact, the "Dignity Plan" has been recentely offitially described as: "dignity means to have a Bolivia free from trafficking in narcotics, not exposed to external impositions, free from drugs estigma, poverty and corruption. Dignity implies to build a democratic culture, based on the full participation of its inhabitants, in the exercise of their rights and the capacity to improve with creativity and work, in order to globally compete in the new millenium." (www.antidroga.gov.bo).
Alternative Development, Eradication, and Interdiction are the basic lines of action of the "Dignity Plan", which are essential to attack the offer of drugs. Those actions are primarily conducted in the coca producing regions and in those potential areas of illegal plantation, such as national parks. A basic strategy is to involve the "cocaleros" in the process of eradication and alternative development, conscious and wilfully. (politica anti-droga).
Therefore, the actual strategy of antidrugs policy in Bolivia, is aimed at reaffirming the national dignity, reinforce the national decision capacity, eliminate the economic dependence of some peasant groups on the coca production and protect the society from the potential harm of trafficking in narcotics. (www.antidroga.gov.bo).
Nevertheless, it may be questioned if the national dignity is really at stake, when Bolivia is not an important consuming country. As well, if there is a serious national decision capacity in the toppic, when public legitimacy seems to be lacking. And finally, if the economic dependence of some peasant sectors on the coca production can be drastically stopped without interfering in culture relativism.
However, some elements of the American influence in the "war against drugs" can be characterized as common feautures of the different Bolivian administrations, described before. These are: the training of army forces, the suppliance of equipment and advise "to capture" the important drugdealers, the coordination of intelligence activities, and the military integration in the application of untidrugs policies.
The Social and Human Rights Site
Eventhough the American "narco guerrilla" theory was not directly applied to the Bolivian case, an increasing link between antidrug policies and internal conflicts has emerged, consequently questioning the final outcome achieved by the American military strategy. (Wola, 1993).
Taking into account that, as indicated by Wola (1993), approximately, 75,000 families are involved in the industry generated by coca and that thousands of persons benefit from employment undirectly derived from it, a social conflict is created when drastic eradication policies are tried to be enforced by the use of force (military, police), which is in fact, well known for its corruption.
Therefore, as a consequence of the "coca zero" strategy, numerous violent confrontations have taken place between the antidrug forces and the civil local population. In fact, some "cocaleros" groups have stimulated the constitution of selfdefense groups to confront the Bolivian military operatives. This situation, linked to the violation of human rights, has given place to think about the possibility of undermining the civil institutions by having an active and central participation of the corrupted military in the "war against drugs".
In fact, last year "cocaleros" organized several national strikes, basically complaining that the government did not comply with the compromises that it assumed. Among them, the set up of proper alternatives to compensate the loss of income derived from the production and commercialization of coca, the offer to give $930 (nine hundred thirty dollars) per year to those who seed anything but coca in the Chapare region, and recently, to "buy" cocaleros the earth. This last proposal has particularly touched the cocaleros sensibilities, who have firmly expressed that coca, in its natural stage, is not cocaine, and that therefore their land and culture should be respected. (La Razón, October, 2001).
"Cocaleros" are mainly demanding that each of the 35.000 families that live in Chapare, could be allowed to cultivate a "cato" of coca, since the guvernmental plan of product substitution has failed for its lack of market competition. As this proposal was rejected by the government, the "cocaleros" declared to be ready to confront the military and police forces (4.000 soldiers) that are located in the area (La Razón, October, 2001).
Before such a reaction, the former President, Jorge Quiroga, stated not to be concerned about the "political bill" and that they will not rest until there is not illegal coca any more. And, that as part of the "Dignity Plan" at least 10.000 families that live in Chapare, shoul accept to be resettled to La Paz, Beni or Santa Cruz. (La Razón, November, 2001).
Consequentely, Amnisty International, in a press release (October, 2001), has denounced that human rights can not be eradicated along the plant of coca. As well, it has asserted that is already time to break the pattern of violations of human rights that has characterized the application of the agreements concluded with the United States for the eradication of cultivations of the plant of coca. Also, it underlined that when assuring the execution of this agreements, the Bolivian authorities cannot ignore the dispositions of their own Constitution and of the international agreements, to which Bolivia is a State Party, that consecrate the fundamental human rights.
As well, as stated by Wola (1993), the human rights concern has not been an important element in any agreement concluded by the US and Bolivia. What is more, by reinforcing the institutions of security in countries such as Bolivia, where they usually act beyond the law, human rights and civil liberties are certainly in danger.
On the other hand, the threatens of the Embassador of the US in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, to suspend the cooperation of his country if the eradication is stopped, have been strongly criticized. (La Razón, November, 2001).
As a result of the repression strategy, the "balloon effect" generated has had important consequences, not only in the production of cocaine issues but also in the levels of violence, producing the phenomenon of internally displaced people. (La Razón, October, 2001).
The Double Standards in the Antidrugs Policy
What strikes the attention in the fight against the trafficking in drugs is the double standards applied by some states and governments, in particular of the United States of America.
To exemplify, the HUANCHACA case can be remembered, which occured at the end of the '80s, when the well known Bolivian scientific, Noël Kempf Mercado, was murdered by drug dealers. However, after that murder it is questionable that the laboratories of cocaine, found in the place of the incident, belonged to the CIA. Such a fact was being investigated at the time by senator Salazar, who was also murdered.
It should be remembered that coincidentally, at that time, the CIA was involved in the case ”IRAN / CONTRAS” (better known as “IRANGATE”), where the trade of drugs and weapons by means of a circuit between Iran and the paramilitary “Contras” of Nicaragua, allowing to this intelligence organism the generation of illegal sources of financing for the realization of different operations was denounced. In all of this trouble, the DEA played an important role disclosing information concerning the Huanchaca case. Evidentely, this was part of the struggle for a bigger federal budget that arose at that time between the DEA and the CIA.
As well, the well known incitement to the consumption of drugs by the government of the US to its own soldiers in Vietnam, is worth to be recalled while talking about the double standards applied by the US in the “war against drugs”. It makes also difficult to find a legitimate authority to fight the drugs abroad in a state that lacks of serious domestic policies to face its own social dilema given by the great demand of drugs that it has (Wola, 1993).
In fact, as aserted by Peter Reuter in Wola (1993), it has been seen along the years that the eradication programs, the sustitution or the destruction of laboratories, do not represent an effective tool to achieve the consuming reduction in the US.
It is also questionable why the US and Europe do not adopt sanctions against the big transnational and corporations that produce the essential precursors (sulfuric acid, thiner, etc.,) for the production of cocaine and other drugs that move more than 500.000 millions of dollars each year (Nolasco Presiga, 2000).
Nevertheless, it has been a primary objective for the american government to dismantle the drug dealers organizations in the Andean region, as has happened in the Bolivian case. In fact, the CIA and DEA have invested millions of dollars in inteligence operations to closely follow and control probable drug dealers. As an example of that, the controversial operation that took place in Santa Ana, Bolivia, in June 1991, can be mentioned. (Wola, 1993).
Neither the government of the US nor the one of Bolivia have worried as much in other type of drugs, such as the alcohol, that has become a serious issue of public health and represents one of the main causes of death in Bolivia. (La Razón, 2001). What kind of social and sustained policies do these governments assume toward their youth to avoid the consumption of drugs? What kind of society and future offer them? These are some of the questions that people wonder at present in Bolivia.
In light of such a paradox, it can be asserted that the anti drug policy of the United States and its firm will to maintain the traffic of drugs as an illegal activity responds rather to economic reasons and of survival of its own federal agencies, but also to geo-strategic dominance plans (Ambos, 1998).
In fact, as stated by Wola (1993), the american military forces try to justify its budgets and technologies with the "war against drugs". The training given to the Bolivian "antidrug forces" is similar to the one given to the infantry. Nevertheless, most of top officials still believe that enforcing untidrug policies is not an appropriate task for the military.
After September the 11th, the US redesigned a foreign diplomatic agenda. As a result, for Latin American countries in particular, the condition to render financial assistance has become narrowly linked to the war against "narcoterrorism". In that regard, the former American Ambassador in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, publicly expressed the parallel drawn by American authorities between narcotics and terrorism (Debate - La Epoca, August 25, 2002). What is more, the same former Bolivia's President, Jorge Quiroga, following that trend publicly identified the trafficking in narcotics and terrorism as "twins", giving place to think on a broader and probably indiscriminate war against drugs (Mirtenbaum, 2002).
As a consequence, it can be asserted that at present, the support for market reforms and democracy building process, priorities that embraced the former American agendas, have become subordinated to the war against drugs (Gamarra, 2002).
That shift of interest has been certainly reflected by the performance of the former American Ambassador in Bolivia, Manuel Rocha. He played an important role in the "opposition" directed to Evo Morales, the coca producers’ leader, member of Congress and former candidate to the presidency who achieved the second position in the last presidential election (July, 2002). In fact, four days before the presidential elections, on June 26, 2002, Rocha, while giving a speech in front of the former President Quiroga, said that "Bolivians should take into account the consequences derived from electing leaders somehow connected to narcotics and terrorism" (Gomez, July 21, 2002).
As well, Manfred Reyes Villa, presidential candidate who obtained the third place, publicly admitted that he had been "advised" by Manuel Rocha not to form any political alliance with the Movement toward Socialism, Morales' political party (Chávez, July, 2002).
In spite of the strong criticism that the position undertaken by the former American Ambassador in Bolivia generated among civil society and in the same Presidential candidates, the government awarded Manuel Rocha the annual prize conferred to "distinguished personalities", before he left office (August, 2002).
As it can be noticed, Sanchez de Lozada's current administration is between two dangerous scenarios: carry on with the eradication strategy and assume the social cost that it embraces, or not assume it but instead face the consequences derived to Bolivia from its relationship with the US.
In a global economy of free market where the logic of th offer and demand is the governing law, maintaining the illicit character for certain drugs seems to be incoherent, just as has been asserted by the American nobel prize of economy, Milton Friedman, and after the well known unsuccessful experience of the “Dry Law” at the beginning of last century.
Since 1997 to present, 44.515 hectares of coca were destroyed. In 1997, 3717 hectares were eradicated. In 1998, 11.621; in 1999, 16.999; in 2000, 7953, and during 2001 -until October- 4212. According to this data, the government affirmes that at present, the production of cocaine is less than a half of what was produced in 1997. (La Razón, November, 2001). Nevertheless, according to the Latinamerican Research Center, along these last four years, the amount of people who consume drugs has increased, in particular in relation to marihuana.
Therefore, it is questionable if such a repressive policy against the leaf of coca is justified, when despite the will of a developing country such as Bolivia, it is clear that the trafficking in narcotics will continue to exist, and even more when the respect of human rights and social welfare are at stage.
(*) Lawyers, LL.M International Law
(**)Paper for Idaho University (USA) and Max Planck Institute for International Criminal Law (Germany)